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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves competing hair salon businesses located in Pocatello, Bannock

County, Idaho. Appellant employed Respondent AMANDA SHULER and Defendants Cassie
Moser, Britney Harrington, Kortni Ellett, Jara Daley and Emily Coffin (hereafter collectively
referred to herein as "Defendants" unless specified individually), in various capacities.
In February 20 11 Respondent Shuler and the Defendants all left their employment with
Appellant to start a competing hair salon business known as EIKOVA SALON AND SPA, LLC,
which is an Idaho limited liability company, (hereafter, Respondent Shuler and Eikova Salon and
Spa, LLC will collectively be referred to herein as "Respondents" unless specified otherwise.)
Appellant filed suit in Bannock County District Court alleging nine different claims and/or
causes of action.

1

Respondents fil ed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the District Court granted.
Appellant appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court entered a decision concerning issues of fact that
it believed existed surrounding a document known as the Baby Shower List, and remanded the
case back to the District Court for further proceedings.2

1

R.at13- 17.
The original appeal and this Court' s decision are reported as, La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158
Idaho 799, 353 P.3d 420 (201 5).

2

3

Following the remand, a second summary judgment was filed by Respondents. 3
Respondents' second summary judgment included the Affidavit of Amanda Shuler, together with
the actual Baby Shower List attached as an exhibit which had been located subsequent to the first
appeal, together w ith photographs from the baby shower itself. 4 Appellant filed its brief in
opposition.5 However, Appellant did not file any opposing affidavits or any other supporting
documents in opposition to Respondents' second motion for summary judgment other than its
opposing brief.

6

The District Court reviewed all of the materials presented by the parties, and conducted
oral arguments. Thereafter, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision on May 4,
20 17, granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents and dismissing Appellant' s case.
Appellant filed a motion to amend or alter the District Court's memorandum decision. 7
Respondents filed a motion and memorandum for attorney fees and costs. 8 The District Court
took both motions under advisement and thereafter entered its Memorandum Decision and
Order9 and ruled against the Appellant and in favor of the Respondents and entered an award of
attorney fees and costs to the Respondents. 10

3

R. at 36-47.
R. at 48-56 and Exhibit BB.
5
R. at 57-62.
6
R. at 66.
7
Appellant did not include this on the Clerk's record.
8
Appellant did not inc lude this on the Clerk' s record.
9
R. at 82-11 3.
10
R. at 111 - 11 2.
4

4

In its Decision denying Appellant's motion to reconsider, the District Court made
specific references to the fact that the Appellant had failed on two specific occasions to present
any new evidence that would show that a genuine issue of fact existed.
First, the District Court stated that the Appellant had failed to present such evidence
during the second motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the District Court stated, "[t]his
Court' s decision to grant summary judgment turned on the lack of contrary affidavit or other
evidence.

In response to the [Respondents' ] Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the

[Appellant] submitted an opposition brief, but declined to present any new evidence." 11
Second, the District Court noted that in requesting reconsideration of its decision, the
Appellants again "did not present any evidence to counter the arguments and evidence submitted
by the [Respondents] in support of their second Motion for Summary Judgment.
evidence on the record is still undisputed."

12

Thus, the

The District Court further stated, " it is fitting to

again note the fact that the [Appellant] has still done nothing to dispute the new testimony from
Defendant Shuler." 13
An Amended Judgment was entered by the District Court in favo r of the Respondents

awarding to Respondents their costs and attorney fees in this matter.

11

R.
R.
13
R.
14
R.
12

at 95 -97.
at 97.
at 99.
at 114-115.

5

14

The Appellant filed a second appeal on the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order granting summary judgment and on the Amended Judgment awarding Respondents their
costs and attorney fees.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondents rely upon the undisputed and unopposed facts set forth in its Second Motion

for Summary Judgment, which facts are supported by the Affidavit of Amanda Shuler.

15

Said undi sputed and unopposed facts are as follows:
I.

The Baby Shower List was located by Respondents and copies were provided to

the Appellant through discovery.

The Baby Shower List was then used as the basis for

Respondents' filings its Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

16

Photographs from the baby shower itself were also located and were added to the

Affidavit as Exhibit BB. 17 These photographs show the use of the Baby Shower List out in the
open by non-employees of the Appellant. Further, these photographs show Appellant's owner,
Candy Bernard-Davidson, who is the sole owner of Appellant at the baby shower where she saw
the open use of the Baby Shower List. 18

15

R.
R.
17
R.
18
R.
16

at 48-50.
at 49 (paragraph 3); and 52-56.
at 48-56 and Exhibit "BB" .
at 49 (paragraph 4) and Exhibit BB.

6

3.

The Baby Shower List was used at the baby shower to provide notes to

Respondent Shuler about the gifts that were given to her by those who attended the baby
shower. 19
4.

The notes taken on the Baby Shower List were written down by Amy Comstock

(photographs CIMO 1662, 1672, 1673, 1674, 1675, 1676, 1677, 1682, and 1683) and Tami
Comstock (photographs CIMO 1687, 169 1, 1698).20
5.

Appellant's owner, Ms. Bernard-Davidson, 1s m photograph CIMO 1685

evidencing that she attended the baby shower, and could see, like everyone else that attended the
baby shower could see, the open use of the Baby Shower List. 21
6.

The Baby Shower List that is attached as Exhibit "AA" was printed and taken to

the baby shower and was used openly. Handwritten notes were made upon the Baby Shower
List openly as gifts were opened. 22
7.

The baby shower was organized, sponsored by, and put on by Ms. Bemard-

Davidson, Amy Comstock and Tami Comstock.
8.

23

At the time that the Baby Shower List was compiled and created, neither Amy

Comstock nor Tami Comstock were employed by Plaintiff. 24

19

R. at 49 (paragraph 5.)
R. at 49 (paragraph 6) and Exhibit BB.
21
R. at 49 (paragraph 7) and Exhibit BB.
22
R. at 50 (paragraph 11) and Exhibits AA and BB.
23
R. at 50 (paragraph 12).
24
R. at 50 (paragraph 13).
20

7

9.

The names contained on the Baby Shower List are people that are known to

Respondents personally. They are friends and acquaintances that Respondents already knew.
There is no confidential information contained in the Baby Shower List. 25

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Appellant m the
Appellants' Brief:
1. Whether the District Court properly granted Respondents' second motion for
summary judgment based upon the record before it?

In addition, Respondents identify the following issues on appeal:
2. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court is required to decide an issue raised for the first
time on appeal?
3. Whether Respondents are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
I.C. § 12-121(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a breach of an employment contract. Metcalf v. Jntermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 626,

25

R. at 50 (paragraph 14).

8

778 P.2d 744, 748 (Idaho 1989). Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are
considered commercial transactions, subject to the attorney fee provision of LC. § 12-120(3).

Oakes v. Boise Hear Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 547, 272 P.3d 512, 519 (2012).
The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision that " [w]here a party alleges the
existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12-1 20(3) .. . that claim
triggers the application of [LC. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing party may recover fees even though
no liability under a contract was established." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d
608, 6 15 (20 11), citing, Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772
(1994).
In the present case, in its complaint, the Appellant specifically alleged that Respondent
Shuler and each of the individual Defendants "violated her non-compete agreement, her
confidentiality agreement, her duty of loyalty, her fiduciary duty and her obligation of good faith
and fair dealing." 26 In its appeal, the Appellant still claims and maintains that Respondent Shuler
breached her Confidentiality Agreement.

Thus, at all stages in this litigation, including the

present appeal, the Appellant is making claims involving employment contracts and employment
relationships between it and Respondent Shuler. As the case law cited above demonstrates, any
claims or disputes involving an employment contract trigger a right to an award of attorney fees
as a commercial transaction pursuant to J.C. § 12-1 20(3).

26

R. at IO 1-111.

9

For these reasons, and grounds, and based upon the uncontroverted record and the
applicable law set forth above, Respondents respectfully requests that it be awarded all of its
reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ARGUMENT

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAND ARD OF REVIEW
The summary judgment rendered by the District Court in favor of the Respondents was

proper. Summary Judgment is appropriate when" ... the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law." State v. Rubbermaid,
129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,
530-31 , 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 ( 1994). It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a
genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than just
conclusory assertions, or assumptions or beliefs that an issue of material fact exists. Van Ve/son

Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc. , 126 Idaho 401 , 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, ( 1994). "Rather, the
[opposing party] must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that

10

there is a genuine issue for trial." Tu/Ile v. Sudenga Indus. , Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d
473 , 478 (1994).
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element
essentiaJ to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial. This
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 56(c). See, Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 ( 1998). In Cellotex, Justice Renquist
wrote for the majority and explained:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for di scovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
fa ilure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter of law ... 477 U.S. at 322-323.
As a result of Cellotex, the Appellant in this case cannot fai l to provide evidence on the
record to defeat Summary Judgment. Rather the Appellant must introduce or point to facts in the
record that support each element of each claim asserted in Appellant' s Second Amended
Complaint.
In the present case the District Court properly granted Respondents' second motion for
summary judgment. Further, the District Court properly denied Appellant' s motion to alter or
amend and a sua sponte motion for reconsideration. Respondents presented additional evidence

11

by producing the original Baby Shower List, the photographs of the baby shower and by
presenting evidence from Respondents that everyone on the Baby Shower List was known to her
personally.
In response, Appellant fai led two times to present any additional evidence on the record
upon which the District Court could rely to refute the evidence provided by the Respondents. 27
Additionally, the Appellant failed two times to cite to the Di strict Court any evidence on the
record that would support its remaining claims against the Respondents.28 All that Appellant did
in its opposition to Respondents' second motion for summary judgment and in its motion to alter
or amend is try to cloud the validity of the Baby Shower List through argument and conjecture
without providing any actual opposing testimony or other evidence by way of affidavit or
otherwise.

29

The District Court properly recognized that Appellant had failed to meet its burden of
"showing the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." The District Court properly found
that Appellant had provided no facts or evidence to contradict the evidence provided by the
Respondents about the Baby Shower List and the names located thereon, or that any issues of
fact remained in the case and awarded summary judgment in favor of Respondents. 30

27

R. at 66.
R. at 57-62.
29
R. at 58, and 60-6 I.
30
R. at 68-69.
28

12

Further, the District Court properly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend.3 1
Finally, the District Court properly found that Appellants claims triggered an attorney award in
favor of Respondents and the Defendants pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e). 32 For
these reasons, all of Appellant's claims fail , there are no remaining valid causes of action for
Appellant to pursue, and the dismissal Appellant's Complaint and this litigation by the District
Court through Respondents' second motion for summary judgment was proper.

11.

APPELLANT FAILED TO CITE TO ANY SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE ON THE
RECORD DURING THE SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The District Court properly granted Respondents' second motion for summary judgment

because Appellant failed to either provide or to cite to any facts on the record upon which the
District Court could rely. When it comes to a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure specifically states that "a party asserting that a fact is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record." See,
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l)(A).

More particularly, Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

specifically states that the district court need consider only the cited materials. See, I.R.C.P.
56(c)(3 ).
These rules simply codify longstand ing cases. For example, in Esser Electric v. Lost

River Ballistics Technologies, Inc. , 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008), this Court

31
32

R. at 82-113.
R. at 82-113.

13

held that "the trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that may create
a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary j udgment is required to bring
that evidence to the court's attention." Additionally, a similar decision was rendered in Vreeken

v. Lockwood Eng 'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 103-04, 2 18 P.3d 11 50, 11 64-65 (2009). The appellants
in Vreeken " admittedly fa iled to contest the respondents' motion for summary judgment." Id. at
103, 2 18 P.3d at 11 64. Nonetheless, the Vreeken appellants argued that the court should have
searched the record for genuine issues of material fact. Id. This Court held that the appellants'
contention was unfou nded and contrary to prior case precedent. Id. In its ruling, this Court
specificall y supported the proposition that the district court is not required to search the record
looking for evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 103-04, 21 8 P.3d at
11 64. Indeed, the Vreeken Court lifted the above-quoted language from Esser Electric, and
determined that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Id.
Thus, whether a motion for summary judgment goes uncontested or is fervently fought, a
district court, in ruling on the motion, need not scour the record for evidence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Quemada v. Arizmendez (In re Estate of Ortega), 153 Idaho 609,616,288 P.3d
826, 833 (20 12). The burden remains on the party opposing summary j udgment to either present
evidence or to cite to evidence in the record.

14

In the present case, it is undisputed that Respondents filed a second motion for summary
judgment. 33

In support of its second motion for summary judgment, Respondents filed the

Affidavit of Amanda Shuler which contained specific testimony about the Baby Shower List. 34
This Affidavit also contained the Baby Shower List itself as an exhi bit.

35

Finally, this Affidavit

contained photographs from the baby shower which evidenced the use of the Baby Shower List
openly and in front of the Appellant' s sole owner. 36 All of this testimony, documentary evidence
and photographic evidence was cited to in support of Respondents' second motion for summary
judgment. 37
In response to these citations of evidence on the record, Appellant fil ed its Brief in
Opposition.38

However, with the exception of c iting to an earlier and irrelevant deposition

statement39 Appellant neither provided any new evidence nor cited to any other portion of the
record in any way. 40 Rather, Appellant simply provided argument to the District Court.
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court reviewed a ll of the procedures that had
occurred in this case. The District Court determined that based on oral argument the remaining

33

R. at 36-47.
R. at 48-56.
35
R. at 52-56.
36
R. at 48-56, and Exhibit "BB" .
37
R. at 36-47.
38
R. at 57-62.
39
R. at 6 1.
40
R. at 57-62.
34

15

issues revolved around the Baby Shower List.

41

The District Court then analyzed the Affidavit

of Amanda Shuler, and the evidence that this affidavit placed on the record, including
Ms. Shuler's testimony, the Baby Shower List, and the photographs.42 The District Court then
correctly determined that Appellant had failed to provide any additional evidence or cite to any
evidence on the record that disputed the facts established by Ms. Shuler's affidavit.

43

The

District Court then declared that Appellant had "failed to meet its burden of showing that a trade
secret actually existed, and the Appellant' s claims regarding a vio lation of the ITSA necessarily
cannot stand.',44
Based upon this analysis, which was supported by the record, the District Court properly
found that Appellant's c laims that the Respondents had violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act
were unsupported. 45 There were no citations to any evidence on the record by the Appellant. As
a result, the District Court properly granted Respondent's second motion for summary judgment
46

and dismissed Appellant's case.

However, the Appellant now for the first time raises arguments and provides citations to
the record that it never made to the District Court during the summary judgment proceedings.
Specifically, in its Appellant's Brief, the Appellant now cites to affidavits which it did not

41

R.
R.
43
R.
44
R.
45
R.
46
R.
42

at 68-69.
at 7 1-73.
at 73-74.
at 75.
at 75.
at 76.

16

previously bring before the District Court. 4 7 Additionally, the Appellant states specifically that
the District Court "erred when it did not consider the entire court record when it entered a second
summary Judgment in favor of the [Respondents]."48

It is undisputed that during the

proceedings on Respondents' second motion for summary judgment, Appellant failed to make
any of these citations or to make any of the arguments it is now making.49
The District Court's review of the record from the citations made by the parties; its
analysis of the evidence and the claims; and its dismissal of Appellant' s case during the
summary judgment proceedings were all proper.

The Appellant failed in its burden under

existing rules and law to cite the District Court to any evidence of any sort on the record that
supported its arguments during the summary judgment proceedings.
Moreover, the Appellant's claims cannot now stand on arguments and/or citations to
evidence it is raising for the first time in this appea l. "This Court will not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal." Stale v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (Idaho 2017), ciling,

Mickelsen Const., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 2 12 (20 13). Rather,
"[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented
below." State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (Idaho 201 7), citing, Nelson v. Nelson,
144 ldaho 7 10,714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007)(italics added).

47

48
49

See Appellants' Brief, pages 8-9.
See Appellants Brief, Issues Presented on Appeal, page 5.
R. at 57-62.

17

Appe llant had an opportunity to either create a record or to cite to a record upon which
the District Court could rely during the summary judgment proceedings. It is undisputed in the
present case that the Appellant failed to do this. The Appellant cannot do so now on appeal for
the first time. Based upon the record that existed before the District Court during the summary
judgment proceedings, Appellant' s claims remain unsupported, the District Court' s decision to
grant summary judgment was proper, and this Court should uphold the District Court' s decision
and deny Appellant' s appeal.

III.

APPELLANT FAILED TO CITE TO ANY SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE ON THE
RECORD IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
Additionally, Appellant failed a second time to cite to any evidence on the record, or to

present any new evidence, in support of its motion to alter or amend, and the District Court' s
decision denying Appellant' s motion and dismissing Appellant' s claims was proper. The rules
and laws set forth above in section II are applicable to this argument, and to avoid redundancy
are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully.
Following the granting of Respondents' second motion for summary judgment, the
Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend. An opposing brief was filed and oral arguments were
made by the parties to the District Court, who took the matter under advisement and then issued
its Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's motion. 50

so R. at 82- 11 3.

18

In reaching its decision, the District Court reviewed the entire history of the case. The
District Court recited the specific rules and other legal bases which Appellant raised to alter or
amend the District Court' s decision to grant the second motion for summary judgment and
dismiss Appellant' s claims. The District Court analyzed the specific reasons raised by the
Appellant and declined to change its decision.

51

The District Court then took it a step further. Although not raised in Appellant's motion,
the Di strict Court sua sponte also analyzed and applied the standard applicable in a motion for
reconsideration.

52

Through its analysis, the District Court stated that the normal basis for a motion for
reconsideration is the presentation of new evidence or citation to the record of evidence that was
overlooked by the trial court. 53

The District Court then analyzed the facts before it and

determined that "the [Appellant] was obligated under the rules of civil procedure to present
actual evidence in opposition to summary judgment.
obligation;" 54

The [Appellant] did not meet that

The District Court further stated, " if the [Appellant] had evidence the

[Respondents] used client information outside of the information included on the baby shower

51

-2
=>

-3

:>

54

R.
R.
R.
R.

at 85-91.
at9 1.
at 91-93, and 98-99.
at 97.

19

list, then the [Appellant] was obligated to present that evidence m opposition to summary
judgment." 55 Finally, the District Court stated,

ln requesting reconsideration of the entry of summary judgment, the [Appellant]
did not come forward with any evidence to counter the arguments and evidence
presented by the [Respondents] in support of their second Motion for Summary
Judgment, nor point to those matters believed to have been overlooked by the
court, explaining why those matters would cause the prior decision to be
erroneous.56
As a result, the District court concluded that there had been nothing offered by the Appellant
"upon which the Court may ' reconsider' its decision on the record before it, and [Appellant's]
Motion to Amend or Alter Memorandum Decision and Order must be denied."

57

The District Court's decision on Appellant's motion to alter or amend, and on its own
analysis of a motion for reconsideration, are proper and should be upheld by thjs Court. As is set
forth above, thjs Court' s "review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were
presented below." State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (Idaho 2017), citing, Nelson v.

Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007)(italics added). Additionally, as was set
forth in Esser Electric, 145 Idaho 91 2, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008), "the trial court is not
required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material
fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court' s
attention."

55

R. at 98.
R. at 99-100.
57
R. at 100.
56

20

Appellant had two separate opportunities to make citations to any evidence on the record
that it wanted, or to point out to the District Court the specific evidence the District Court had
overlooked, but Appellant failed to do so for a second time. Appellant cannot now provide these
citations or present evidence or make arguments such as these for the first time on appeal.
For these reasons, the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion to alter or amend was proper
and should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the District Court's decisions
granting summary judgment and denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend in favor of the
Respondents be affirmed in their entirety, and that Respondents be granted their attorney fees
and costs on appeal.

DATED thi s 2th day of February, 2018.

&
z ;R
Z&
RACINE OLSON NYE

LANE V. ERICKSON, of the firm
Attorneys for Respondents
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[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

David H. Maguire
MAGUIRE LAW, PC
812 E. Clark, Suite A - P.O. Box 4758
Pocatello Idaho 83205-4758
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission

LANE V. ERICKSON
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